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hat happened in 2003 was not a chance occurrence. For the first time nuclear 
power supporters were more numerous than nuclear power opponents in Sweden. 
In the latest 2004 SOM survey nuclear power supporters maintained their lead, although 
with a somewhat smaller advantage than the previous year: 45% want to use nuclear 
power in the long term, compared with 36% who want to abandon it. In the 2003 survey 
the proportion of nuclear power supporters was 46%, compared with 34% opponents (see 
Table 1 and Figure 1).  
W 
   It should be noted that we are not talking about short-term opinions concerning current 
nuclear power disputes, such as, for example, the closure of the Barsebäck reactors. 
When it comes to immediate issues of that kind, the positive opinion towards nuclear 
power was already stronger than the negative opinion. The closure of Barsebäck I in 1999 
was carried out against majority opinion, not with it. The same applies to this year’s 
closure of Barsebäck II.1
   What we are talking about is the long-term use of nuclear power in Sweden – whether it 
should be used as an energy source or not. And in this regard Swedish opinion has always 
clearly favoured phasing out rather than use, ever since the battle over nuclear power was 
started in the middle of the 1970s (Holmberg, Westerståhl and Branzén 1977). But it 
changed in 2003 when the supporters of nuclear power overtook the opponents for the 
first time.2  
  At the time of the 1980 referendum opinions were very different, with 66% wanting the 
phasing-out of nuclear power in the long term, against 30% preferring to use nuclear 
power (Holmberg and Asp 1984). Immediately after the Chernobyl accident in 1986 the 
proportion who wanted to phase out nuclear power increased to as much as 75%, against 
a record low of 12% who wanted to keep it (Holmberg 1988). 
   The favourable wind for supporters of nuclear power has even meant that the 
proportion of people who not only want to use existing reactors, but also want to actively 
invest in more nuclear reactors increased from 2% in 1980 to 6% in 1996 and 15% in 
2004 – still a minority, but a slowly growing minority. Other measurements in the SOM 
survey point in the same direction. Opinion is shifting towards more support for using 
nuclear power and towards increased support for building more reactors (see Table 1 in 
Per Hedberg’s chapter). 
                                                 
1 In a SIFO survey from January 2003, 62% responded “no” to the question “Do you think that the nuclear power 
station Barsebäck 2 should be closed, or not?”. The proportion that responded “yes” was 24%, while 13% were 
doubtful or responded “don’t know” (Sifo 2003). Broken down by party preference, the results look as follows: Left 
Party no 37%/yes 50%; Social Democrats 62/23; Centre Party 46/44; Liberal Party 76/18; Moderate Party 86/9; 
Christian Democrats 75/11 and Green Party 27/63. The outcome points to a clear leaning towards “no” among 
supporters of the Social Democrats, the Liberal Party, the Moderate Party and the Christian Democrats, a slight leaning 
towards “no” among Centre Party supporters, a slight leaning towards “yes” among Left Party supporters and a clear 
leaning towards “yes” among Green Party supporters. In other words, the Social Democrat Government does not have a 
majority of its own voters behind it on the decision to close Barsebäck II. In fact, a clear majority of Social Democrat 
supporters are against closing Barsebäck II (62%). On the other hand, this situation is not news. A majority of Social 
Democrat voters were also against starting the phasing out of nuclear power in 1999 (Holmberg 2000:326). 
2 An historic perspective on the development of opinions on nuclear power can be found in the booklet 
“Kärnkraftsopinionen 25 år efter folkomröstningen” (“Opinions on nuclear power 25 years after the referendum”). The 
measurements were carried out by Temo and financed by the organisation Kärnkraftssäkerhet och utbildning AB 
(Nuclear power safety and education AB) which is close to the nuclear power industry. See Modig (2005). 
 
Table 1 Views on the long-term use of nuclear power in Sweden (per cent)  
 
question: “What is your view on the long-term use of nuclear power as an energy source in 
Sweden?” 
 
view 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 
phase out nuclear power by 2010 at the latest 22 19 17 16 15 14
 
12 
 
12 
 
11 
 
phase out nuclear power, but use the nuclear 
reactors we have until they have served out 
their time 31 32 40 34 29 28
 
 
27 
 
 
22 
 
 
25 
 
use nuclear power and then renovate the 
nuclear reactors, but do not build more 18 19 21 19 26 29
 
 
28 
 
 
31 
 
 
30 
 
use nuclear power and invest in more nuclear 
reactors in future 6 7 5 7 10 9
 
 
11 
 
 
15 
 
 
15 
no particular view/no response 23 23 17 24 20 20
 
22 
 
20 
 
19 
    
     total per cent 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
     number of people 1779 1754 1740 1703 1704 1739 1777 1818 1774 
    
     proportion phase out 53 51 57 50 44 42 39 34 36 
     proportion use 24 26 26 26 36 38 39 46 45 
     net balance, phase out +29 +25 +31 +24 +8 +4 ±0 -12 -9 
 
Comments: The wording of the question in the years 2000-2004 was somewhat different to the wording in the years 1996-1999. 
 
Figure 1 Phase out or use nuclear power in the long term?  
 Development in opinion 1986-2004 (per cent) 
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ents: See Table 1 for the wording of the survey question in 2004. Response options 1-2 have been defined as 
e out”, while response options 3-4 have been classified as “use”. In the years 1986-1997 and 1996-1999 a slightly 
ent survey question was used. In Figure 1 the older five-part survey question was used for the years 1986–1997 
e new four-part one thereafter. 
Table 2 Phase out nuclear power in the long term 
 
statement: “Sweden should phase out nuclear power in the long term”  
 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
very good proposal     22     21     22     19    17 14 14 
quite good proposal     25     23     22     21    23 19 19 
neither good nor bad proposal     21     22     21     23    23 23 23 
quite bad proposal     16     16     18     17    17 20 20 
very bad proposal     13     13     12     14    14 19 18 
no response       3       5       5       6      6 5 6 
        
   total per cent   100   100   100   100  100   100 100 
   number of people 3561 3503 1842 3638 3606 3675 3612 
        
   proportion good      47     44     44      40    40 33 33 
   proportion bad     29     29     30     31    31 39 38 
        
   net balance, good proposal   +18   +15   +14    +9    +9 -6 -5 
 
The recovery in opinion on the side of nuclear power supporters came in two stages. First 
at the end of the 1980s when the immediate effects of Chernobyl faded away. Then in the 
most recent five-year period when the phasing out of nuclear power started, the electricity 
market was exposed to competition and electricity prices increased dramatically. All this 
over a twenty year period in which no serious nuclear accidents have occurred. 
 
Not as dangerous 
The reduced opposition to nuclear power is clearly connected with people’s assessment 
of risk. Nuclear power is not regarded to be as dangerous now as it was twenty or thirty 
years ago. It has been a long time since anything nasty occurred. The risk of a major 
nuclear accident in Sweden was given on average – on a scale of 1 (low risk) to 10 (high 
risk) – a value of 6.2 by the Swedish people in 1980 and 6.8 in 1986 immediately after 
the Chernobyl accident. Today in the 2000s the corresponding risk assessment is much 
lower, 5.4 in 2004 (see Table 3). This is one of the main reasons for the reduced 
opposition to nuclear power in Sweden. But it does not explain why opposition has 
declined in recent years. The danger of nuclear power has not been judged to be declining 
in the past six to seven years. The level of risk is perceived as roughly the same today as 
at the end of the 1990s. In other words, no toned-down risk assessments lie behind the 
shift in opinion in favour of nuclear power in recent years.3 In the short term other factors 
have had an effect.  
 
                                                 
3 The correlation at the level of individuals between views on nuclear power and various risk assessments is strong, but 
in many cases even these have diminished in recent years, with one exception – the risk that eastern Europe cannot 
safely manage its nuclear power. The correlations is as follows in some SOM studies in various years. The risk of a 
reactor accident in Sweden: .62 1986, .57 1993 and .50 2004. The risk that we cannot safely manage the ultimate 
disposal of nuclear power in Sweden: .61 1986, .55 1993 and .53 2004. The risk of the spread of atomic weapons: .45 
1986, .43 1993 and .36 2004. The risk that eastern Europe cannot manage nuclear power safely: .13 1995, .16 2002 and 
.20 2004. In other words, it is the assessments of the Swedish-related nuclear power risks that are most strongly linked 
to the views on the future of nuclear power in Sweden.   
Table 3 Risk assessments on the question of nuclear power 1980-2004 (average)  
 
question: “What is your view on the following risks which have been discussed in connection with nuclear 
power? How big is the risk …” 
 
How big is the risk: 80 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 
 
that nuclear power leads 
to more and more 
countries obtaining 
nuclear weapons? 
 
 
 
6.2 
 
 
 
6.8 
 
 
 
6.5 
 
 
 
5.8 
 
 
 
5.7
 
 
 
5.5
 
 
 
5.9
 
 
 
5.7
 
 
 
5.9
 
 
 
5.8
 
 
 
5.6
 
 
 
5.9
 
 
 
5.2
 
 
 
5.2
 
 
 
5.5 
 
 
 
5.0 
 
 
 
5.0 
 
 
 
5.2 
 
 
 
5.4
 
 
 
5.4
 
that we in Sweden cannot 
manage and ultimately 
dispose of nuclear waste 
in a safe way? 
 
 
 
 
--- 
 
 
 
 
6.1 
 
 
 
 
6.1 
 
 
 
 
5.8 
 
 
 
 
5.7
 
 
 
 
5.2
 
 
 
 
5.4
 
 
 
 
5.3
 
 
 
 
5.1
 
 
 
 
5.3
 
 
 
 
4.8
 
 
 
 
5.2
 
 
 
 
4.5
 
 
 
 
5.0
 
 
 
 
4.6 
 
 
 
 
4.8 
 
 
 
 
4.6 
 
 
 
 
4.5 
 
 
 
 
4.7
 
 
 
 
4.5
 
of a major accident with 
radioactive discharge at a 
nuclear power station in 
Sweden? 
 
 
 
4.8 
 
 
 
4.8 
 
 
 
4.4 
 
 
 
3.9 
 
 
 
3.9
 
 
 
3.5
 
 
 
3.7
 
 
 
3.7
 
 
 
4.0
 
 
 
3.9
 
 
 
3.6
 
 
 
3.9
 
 
 
3.7
 
 
 
3.6
 
 
 
3.6 
 
 
 
3.5 
 
 
 
3.6 
 
 
 
3.4 
 
 
 
4.0
 
 
 
3.6
 
that the countries of 
eastern Europe cannot 
manage their nuclear 
power stations and 
nuclear waste in a safe 
way? 
 
 
 
 
 
--- 
 
 
 
 
 
--- 
 
 
 
 
 
--- 
 
 
 
 
 
--- 
 
 
 
 
 
--- 
 
 
 
 
 
--- 
 
 
 
 
 
--- 
 
 
 
 
 
--- 
 
 
 
 
 
--- 
 
 
 
 
 
8.8
 
 
 
 
 
8.7
 
 
 
 
 
8.9
 
 
 
 
 
8.4
 
 
 
 
 
8.5
 
 
 
 
 
8.5 
 
 
 
 
 
8.5 
 
 
 
 
 
8.2 
 
 
 
 
 
8.1 
 
 
 
 
 
8.2
 
 
 
 
 
8.0
 
Comments: The average can vary from 1.0 (very low risk) to 10.0 (very high risk). The figures for 1980 are taken from Kampen om 
kärnkraften (The battle over nuclear power) by Sören Holmberg and Kent Asp (1984: 476). A “–” indicates that the question was not 
asked.  
 
Electricity price sensitivity 
A factor on which there is speculation is the increases in electricity prices. There has been 
talk of continued high electricity prices, or even increasing prices, if nuclear power is 
phased out. However, we do not have any firm evidence that the increased electricity 
prices have really influenced opinion in favour of nuclear power. But it is thought that 
groups sensitive to electricity prices in particular are among those who have become 
more positive towards nuclear power – self-interest shall have kicked in. However, a 
more thorough test of such a hypothesis cannot be carried out since we lack data on 
people’s electricity price sensitivity over time. But we are not entirely at a loss. On at 
least one occasion the Swedish people’s economic sensitivity to the price of electricity 
has been measured. That is in the 2004 SOM survey. We cannot measure the time-series 
relationship, but we can examine the link at the level of individuals between views on 
nuclear power and electricity price sensitivity.  
  We asked: “How financially dependent is your household on the price of electricity?” 
There were four response options from very dependent to not dependent at all. The 
results show that a majority indicated that they were very dependent or quite dependent 
on the price of electricity (58%), while a quite large minority responded that there were 
not particularly or not at all dependent (38%). According to the hypothesis, we would 
expect to find a larger proportion of nuclear power supporters among electricity price 
sensitive people than among those who say they are not particularly financially dependent 
on the price of electricity. The results point to a directly reversed relationship. Electricity 
price sensitive people tend to be somewhat less positive towards using nuclear power that 
people who are not electricity price sensitive. The most positive towards nuclear power 
are people who say that they are not at all financially dependent on the price of electricity 
(see Table 4). The relationship is relatively weak, but it does go in the opposite direction 
to that predicted by the self-interest hypothesis.  
   The results may be somewhat surprising to those who believe that Homo Economicus 
always makes his presence felt. In this case we must look deeper to find his faint shadow. 
If we control for income – which is important because rich people are both less electricity 
price sensitive than poor people and more positive towards nuclear energy – it transpires 
that the relationship is the one expected, although very weak. That is to say that within 
each income group electricity price sensitive people tend to be somewhat more positive 
towards nuclear power than people who are not particularly electricity price sensitive. 
The factor “electricity price sensitivity” thus has the expected effect on attitudes to 
nuclear power, but the effect is very modest. 
 
Unchanged social patterns 
The big changes in views on the issue of nuclear power in recent years have not given 
rise to any new patterns with regard to which social and political groups tend to be for or 
against nuclear power. Old truths still apply. The front lines are the same as in the 1970s. 
It is still women, young people, low earners and people living in rural areas who tend to 
be most negative towards nuclear power. Men, older people, people living in towns and 
high earners provide the core of nuclear power supporters today just as in the 1970s (see 
Table 4). However, the differences in views between various social groups should not be 
exaggerated. They exist, but they have always been relatively modest. 
 
Left-right 
The differences in views between different political groups are far more interesting. Here 
we find much bigger differences. People’s views on nuclear power are primarily shaped 
by political and ideological factors, not by social circumstances or by short-term 
economic considerations. The results in Table 4 illustrate very clearly that political 
factors, such as left-right ideology, green attitude and party preference, have a very 
obvious link with people’s views on nuclear power. And again things are largely 
reminiscent of the 1970s when it comes to political party and green attitude, but, 
interestingly enough, not when it comes to left-right ideology. Today, as in the years 
surrounding the 1980 referendum, the largest proportion of nuclear power opponents are 
among Left Party, Green Party and Centre Party supporters, while nuclear power 
supporters are clearly strongest among the Moderates.4 The new environmentally critical 
attitudes of the 1970s also tended to be anti nuclear power and they still are in the 2000s 
(Bennulf 1994). 
                                                 
4 The proportion of votes for option 3 in the 1980 referendum (the most anti nuclear power option) breaks down as 
follows among the parties’ supporters in March 1980: Left Party/Communists 90%, Centre Party 90%, Christian 
Democrats 77%, Liberal Party 28%, Social Democrats 19% and Moderate Party 17% (Holmberg and Asp 1984:381). 
In the 1976 election the order of the party supporters was somewhat different: Centre Party 72%, Left 
Party/Communists 60%, Liberal Party 40%, Moderate Party 38% and Social Democrats 21% (no reliable data on 
Christian Democrats). The 1976 results concern the proportion consistently against nuclear power on a nuclear power 
views index (Holmberg, Westerståhl and Branzén 1977:90). This means that in the 1976 election Social Democrat 
voters were the most positive/least negative towards nuclear power. At the time of the 1980 referendum we had the 
pattern we have today, with Moderate Party voters as the most positive/least negative towards using nuclear power.    
Table 4 Phasing out or using nuclear power in the long term, by various social 
and political variables (per cent) 
 
  
phase 
out 
 
 
use 
 
 
no view
 
total 
percent 
number  
of 
respondents 
 
net  
balance 
gender      
 male  32 57 11 100 882  -25
 female 40 33 27 100 892  +7
age       
 18-30 41 37 22 100 350  +4
 31-60 35 47 18 100 918  -12
 61-85 34 47 19 100 506  -13
education       
 basic level 37 40 23 100 453  -3
 intermediate level 34 48 18 100 789  -14
 university 39 47 14 100 501  -8
place of residence       
 rural area 44 34 22 100 261  +10
 built-up area 35 46 19 100 391  -11
 town, large built-up area 34 48 18 100 820  -14
 the three big cities 37 47 16 100 268  -10
income       
  very low 42 33 25 100 343  +9
  quite low 38 45 17 100 439  -7
  medium 38 42 20 100 301  -4
  quite high 37 50 13 100 291  -13
  very high 29 61 10 100 369  -32
financial dependence on the price of electricity       
  very dependent 35 45 20 100 365  -10
  quite dependent 38 45 17 100 624  -7
  not particularly dependent 38 50 12 100 548  -12
  not at all dependent 35 56   9 100 95  -21
left-right dimension       
  firmly on the left 53 31 16 100 134  +22
  somewhat on the left 46 39 15 100 431  +7
  neither left nor right 35 39 26 100 557  -4
  somewhat on the right 30 58 12 100 419  -28
  firmly on the right 15 72 13 100 141  -57
green dimension       
  firmly green 54 27 19 100 220  +27
  somewhat green 43 42 15 100 473  +1
  neither green nor grey 34 46 20 100 523  -12
  somewhat grey  28 61 11 100 334  -33
  firmly grey 19 65 16 100 116  -46
party preference       
 Left Party 62 27 11 100 149  +35
 Social Democrats 35 43 22 100 570  -8
 Centre Party 51 37 12 100 109  +14
 Liberal Party 31 59 10 100 164  -28
 Moderate Party 18 69 13 100 354  -51
 Christian Democrats 37 39 24 100 80  -2
 Green Party 66 13 21 100 92  +53
   other parties 36 43 21 100 70  -7
 no party 31 33 36 100 186  -2
all repodentsl 36 45 19 100 1774  -9
 
Comments: The interview question on nuclear power is shown in Table 1. The results relate to the year 2004. The question of 
dependence on the price of electricity read: “How financially dependent is your household on the price of electricity: very dependent, 
quite dependent, not particularly dependent, not at all dependent?” The income variable relates to household income. Households with 
incomes between SEK 0 and 200 000 have been categorised as very low, 201 000 to 300 000 as quite low, 301 000 to 400 000 as 
medium, 401 000 to 500 000 as quite high and household incomes from SEK 501 000 upwards as very high. The measure of the green 
dimension is based on a question about an environmentally friendly society. The question is formulated as a proposal where the 
respondent is requested to judge whether the proposal is very good, quite good, neither good nor bad, quite bad or very bad. The 
wording of the question was: “Invest in an environmental society even if it means low or zero growth.” In the table, the scale from 
“very good proposal” to “very bad proposal” has been translated into points on a green-grey dimension where “very good proposal” 
corresponds to “firmly green” and “very bad proposal” corresponds to “firmly grey”. People’s left-right ideology was measured 
through a self-classification question. 
 
   But when it comes to the left-right dimension a clear change can be seen. In the 1970s 
there was no connection between views on nuclear power and left-right. Nuclear power 
opponents and supporters could be found both on the left and on the right; even 
somewhat more on the right in the first surveys (Holmberg, Westerståhl and Branzén 
1977). Nuclear power was a new and separate dimension of conflict in Swedish politics 
in the years around 1976-1980. But that is no longer so. Amongst the wider public 
nuclear power has increasingly become a left-right issue. The correlation(s) between 
people’s attitudes to nuclear power and their left-right views stood at around .00 at the 
time of the 1980 referendum. The first SOM surveys in the 1980s showed corresponding 
values of correlations of around -.15. In the most recent SOM studies the correlations 
have moved further to values of around -.30. In this context, a negative coefficient 
indicates that opposition to nuclear power and the left tend to go together, as do 
supporters of nuclear power and the right.5 At the mass level, nuclear power is no longer 
an alternative dimension of conflict. The left-right dimension has incorporated its 
competitor. 
 
Party polarisation 
However, the pattern of opinions on nuclear power among the parties’ supporters largely 
looks the same as in the 1980 referendum. Now, as then, supporters of the Left Party, 
Green Party and Centre Party have the most anti nuclear power views, with net balances 
in favour of phasing out nuclear power in the long term. Among supporters of the Social 
Democrats, Christian Democrats, Liberal Party and Moderate Party the current balance of 
opinion is that nuclear power should be used in the long term, with Liberal Party and 
Moderate Party supporters the most positive, and Social Democrats and Christian 
Democrats somewhat more divided. Compared with 1980, Christian Democrats in 
particular have moved in terms of opinion from a clear majority voting for option 3 to a 
net balance today in favour of using nuclear power in the long term. Among Social 
Democrat, Liberal and Moderate voters only minorities chose option 3 in 1980. Even at 
that time most voted for the more pro nuclear power options 1 or 2. However, on paper, 
these entail support for a long-term phasing out of nuclear power. In the 1980 referendum 
it was not possible to vote for using nuclear power, only for phasing it out in the long 
term!  
   Compared with the situation in 2003 supporters of all parties have become somewhat 
more negative towards nuclear power, with two exceptions – the Social Democrats, who 
have not changed at all, and the Moderates, who have become somewhat more positive. 
Supporters of the other parties have become somewhat more negative or less positive. 
Left Party and Green Party supporters have made the largest shift towards the negative 
corner, while there is also a clear move towards the critical corner among supporters of 
the Centre Party.6 Thus the favourable wind for nuclear power among Centre Party 
supporters which could be observed in 2003 has not continued in 2004. Instead we can 
see a certain recoil back towards more anti nuclear power views. 
   The shifts in opinions in 2004, which were not dramatic in themselves, mean that party 
polarisation is again increasing somewhat on the issue of nuclear power. Last year the 
                                                 
5 The correlation between subjective left-right position and nuclear power view was -.13 in 1986 and 1987 and -.20 in 
1988. In the SOM surveys in 2002, 2003 and 2004 the corresponding correlations were -.29, -.27 and -.28 respectively 
(Holmberg 2004:189). 
6 The net balance of opinion in favour of phasing out nuclear power was as follows among the supporters of the various 
parties in 2003 and 2004 respectively (the higher the positive value the more negative the view on nuclear power): Left 
Party +21, +35; Social Democrats -8, -8; Centre Party +6, +14; Liberal Party -31, -28; Moderate Party -48, -51; 
Christian Democrats -13, -2; Green Party +41, +53.   
polarisation appeared to be clearly on the way down, but that development has not 
continued in 2004. We can measure the polarisation using the statistical correlation 
coefficient eta, which can vary between .00 (no party polarisation) and 1.00 (maximum 
polarisation). When the issue of nuclear power reached its peak in Swedish politics in the 
years around 1980 the eta coefficient was around .45 to .50. In SOM studies since 1986 
eta has been at lower levels, between a high of .40 (1991) and a low of .28 (2003). In the 
2004 survey eta achieved a value of .40, equalling the highest value we have measured in 
SOM. Party differences amongst the wider public on the issue of nuclear power, 
measured as the degree of polarisation, are thus at least as great today as they has ever 
been over the last twenty years – much smaller than they were during the nuclear power 
debate around 1980, but still considerable. 
 
Trust in players  
Trust is always a key factor when it comes to forming opinion. We are influenced not 
only by arguments but also by who is promoting them. Messages are important, but so 
are messengers. And this is where trust comes in. We are more influenced by messengers 
who we trust.  
  Since they started in 1986, the SOM surveys have measured people’s trust in some of 
the most important players in the nuclear power debate. The results in Table 5 point to 
some interesting changes with regard to who we trust when it comes to energy and 
nuclear power.  
      
Table 5 Trust in various players on the issue of energy and nuclear power. 
Proportion of people indicating a very high or quite high degree of trust 
(per cent) 
 
question: “How much trust do you have in the following groups when it comes to information on energy and nuclear power?” 
 
 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04
                    
environmental organisations 57 65 63 64 61 64 69 68 65 71 67 59 59 65 59 55 61 61 60
nuclear power industry 36 46 47 49 58 52 45 48 42 45 45 41 52 53 52 54 52 55 58
the government 52 52 49 37 36 44 36 43 46 39 38 28 43 42 44 54 52 52 42
scientists 81 89 88 85 87 83 80 83 81 81 85 81 82 85 87 85 85 82 85
journalists 16 21 28 26 20 24 28 30 26 28 29 26 26 30 29 22 25 25 30
national authorities 40 40 44 35 36 38 36 45 42 41 40 33 45 47 56 58 60 59 57
local authority where you live -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 26 35 36 33 37 39 41 34
electricity companies -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 29 27 -- 26
                    
 
Comments: The question also included the response options “little” and “very little” trust. People who did not answer the trust questions  
(between 4% and 10% over the years) are not included in the percentage base. A “–” indicates that the question was not asked. 
 
Until now environmental organisations and the nuclear power industry have been 
opponents in the debate on nuclear power and the environmental side has benefited from 
a higher degree of trust than the industry. The trust figures for environmental 
organisations have always been higher than corresponding figures for the nuclear power 
industry. But it is evening out. Compared with ten years ago, trust in environmental 
organisations is standing still or falling somewhat, while trust in the nuclear power 
industry is increasing. In the latest 2004 survey, 60% expressed trust in environmental 
organisations, compared with 58% for the nuclear power industry. The corresponding 
figures in 1994 were 65% for environmental organisations and 42% for the nuclear power 
industry. Thus it is not only views on nuclear power that have become more positive. 
Trust in the nuclear power industry has also grown.  
   When it comes to other players, it is worth noting the low figures for electricity 
companies, the very strong and stable figures for scientists, and the relatively high figures 
for national authorities. The latter result in particular is very positive. Supervisory 
authorities who have the task of checking that everything is being done correctly should 
have a high level of trust. If we do not trust all the parties, we should at least be able to 
trust the referee.  
   
Advantage nuclear power  
Nuclear power opponents and environmental organisations are losing public support at 
the same time as nuclear power proponents and the nuclear power industry have the wind 
in their sails. This is how the SOM survey trends can be summarised in simple terms. 
Energy and nuclear power issues are no longer big issues on the voters’ agenda. Only 1% 
of respondents in the 2004 SOM survey pointed to energy/nuclear power as an important 
social issue. As recently as 1990 the corresponding proportion was 11%. And if we go 
further back to the 1976 and 1979 elections, nuclear power topped the voters’ list of 
important issues (Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004). But that is no longer the case.  
    The question is what will happen in the 2006 election in the aftermath of the closure of 
Barsebäck II and at the start of a Swedish and international debate on not phasing out 
nuclear power and instead investing in its expansion (Domenici 2004). One of the main 
arguments of the proponents of expansion relates to the greenhouse effect. More nuclear 
power does not contribute to global warming. Among voters the greenhouse effect is 
perceived as one of the greatest threats to the environment. Only the thinning of the 
ozone layer was seen as a bigger threat in the 2004 SOM survey. When we measure the 
degree of concern about changes in the earth’s climate we get similar results, i.e. 
relatively high proportions who express concern – higher proportions than for economic 
crises, for example, but lower than for terrorism.7  
   The problem for the proponents of expansion is, however, that so far public opinion is 
not showing a link between concern over/fear of the greenhouse effect and a positive 
attitude towards nuclear power. At present the opinion patterns are the exact opposite. 
People who see the greenhouse effect as a big risk or are concerned about climate 
changes tend to be the least positive towards nuclear power, not the most positive.8 
Environmental and climate arguments have clearly not worked particularly well so far for 
the proponents of expansion. 
  However, the 2006 election could bring a change in this. Over the past twenty years the 
battle over nuclear power has been about phasing it out. Over the coming years will the 
battle instead be about expansion?  
 
                                                 
7 SOM’s surveys of environmental threat and concern for the future were financed by a research project lead by 
Lennart J. Lundqvist. The measurements of environmental threat cover around ten different threats and the time series 
extend back to 1993. The concern measurements relate to the degree of concern for the future and began in 1986. So far 
they cover around 20 phenomena (e.g. destruction of the environment, unemployment, terrorism, economic crisis, 
increased numbers of refugees etc.), but not every one is measured every year. The results of the concern and 
environmental threat surveys are documented in Holmberg and Nilsson 2005.   
8 Environmental threats are measured on a scale of 1 (low) to 10 (high). In the 2004 survey the lowest proportion of 
nuclear power supporters was found among people who put the greenhouse threat at 10, i.e. among those who 
perceived the greenhouse effect as the most serious. The highest proportion of nuclear power supporters was among 
people who gave the greenhouse threat a risk value of 4, i.e. just below the middle of the scale. The concern question 
had four response options between very worrying to not at all worrying and concerned what people themselves 
perceived as worrying for the future. The lowest proportion of nuclear power supporters was found among people who 
thought that climate changes were very worrying (4) (40%, 625 people). We find the highest proportion of nuclear 
power supporters among the small group of people who do not think that climate changes are worrying at all (65%, 40 
people).    
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